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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS: AN EVALUATION OF THE
SOLUTION PROPOSED BY UNIFORM RULE 15
I.
INTRODUCTION

If two presumptions arise which are conflicting with each other
the judge shall apply the presumption which is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic. If there is no such
preponderance both presumptions shall be disregarded.'
In his Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, Professor Thayer dismisses
the doctrine of conflicting presumptions as "an exotic, ill-adapted to an
English or North American climate."'2 Thayer's disciple, Dean Wigmore,
in his treatise on evidence, states simply that presumptions "do not conflict.'

The American Law Institute 4 and a few courts 5 also adopt this

position that conflicting presumptions cannot arise in the trial of a case.
It has been asserted, however, that most American courts do recognize a
problem of conflicting presumptions and endeavor to solve it in each case,
not by summarily abandoning both presumptions at the first hint of conflict
as Thayer would have them do, but by weighing one against the other and
giving effect to the stronger of the two.0 Uniform Rule of Evidence 15,
quoted above, gives recognition to this practice and offers a solution to the
problem of conflicting presumptions which is more flexible and perhaps
more realistic than the one proposed by Thayer. The purpose of this
comment is to examine the Uniform Rule 15 proposal that conflicting
presumptions should be balanced and the stronger one given effect. For
purposes of contrast, there will also be a brief discussion of the ThayerWigmore approach.
II.
THE NATURE AND

PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS

7

A. Presumption Defined
Generally, the term "presumption" describes a relationship between
one fact or group of facts, called the basic fact (or facts) and another fact
1. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 15.
2. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 343 (1898)

[hereinafter cited

as THAYER].
3. 9 WIGMORE,

EVIDENcE § 2493, p. 292 (3d ed. 1940).
OF EvIDENcE rule 704 (1942).
5.. See, e.g., Town of Lexington v. Ryder, 296 Mass. 566, 6 N.E.2d 828 (1937);
Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N.E. 110 (1909) ; City of Montpelier v. Town
of Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350 (1944).
6. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENcE 37 (3d ed. 1961).
7. For more extensive discussions of the plethora of problems with which this
area of the law is fraught, see Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920) ; McCormick, Charges on
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REv. 291 (1927); Morgan, Some
Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REV. 906 (1931) ; Roberts, An
Introduction to the Study of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. Rzv. 1 (1958).
4. MODEL CODE
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or group of facts, called the presumed fact (or facts).S For convenience the
basic fact may be called A and the presumed fact B. Any more specific
definition in terms of describing the exact relationship between the basic
and presumed facts would of necessity be a definition of one of the specific
"types" of presumption. These are generally recognized to be three:
conclusive, mandatory, and permissive.9
Conclusive presumptions are those which require the trier of fact
absolutely to find B once A is established, i.e., proof of fact A is the legal
equivalent of proof of fact B and the opponent of the presumed fact may
not attempt to rebut its existence. The presumption of a lost grant in
adverse possession is an example of this type. It has been suggested that
conclusive presumptions are not presumptions at all but substantive rules
of law, 10 and in view of the fact that they are irrebuttable this would
certainly seem to be the case.
Mandatory presumptions are those which require the trier of fact to
find fact B, once fact A is established, if insufficient evidence is offered in
rebuttal of the existence of the presumed fact, i.e., given fact A, the trier
must find fact. B unless the opponent of the presumed fact has produced
enough evidence to render the presumption of fact B unwarranted." The
presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate is an example of this
type. Thayer,' 2 Wigmore, 13 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence 14 indicate
that these are the only true presumptions and they are the ones to which
this discussion is primarily directed.
Permissive presumptions are those which permit the trier of fact to
find fact B upon the establishment of fact A although the existence of B
does not logically follow from the existence of A, i.e., given A, the trier
may assume B, though it does not logically follow, unless the opponent of
the presumed fact has produced sufficient evidence to render the presumption unwarranted. These are purely artificial devices created by the courts
to give a party, for reasons of policy, a procedural advantage he would
not otherwise have. Res ipsa loquitur is, in the opinion of some commen(3d ed. 1961).
9. Presumptions are frequently dichotomized into those of law and those of fact.
Where this is done the so-called presumptions of law are said to be the only true
8. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvIDENcn 31

presumptions whereas the so-called presumptions of fact are merely inferences.
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491, p. 288 (3d ed. 1940). See also Bohlen, supra note 7.
According to Thayer, however, such a distinction has "no special significance in the
law of evidence." THAYER 339.

10. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENC9 § 2492 (3d ed. 1940) ; Chafee, The Progress of the
Law, 1919-1921: Evidence, 35 HARV. L. Rev. 302 (1922). See also THAYER 317-19
and Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. R-v. 906, 909
(1931), approving conclusive presumptions as a permissible form of judicial legislation.
11. As to the amount of'evidence required to rebut the presumptions, see subsection B infra.
12. THAYER 317, 321, 326.
13. 9 WIC.MORE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (3d ed. 1940).
14. UNIFORM RULE O1 EvIDENCE 13 defines presumptions as follows: "A presump-

tion is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to

be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action."
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tators, the prime example of a permissive presumption.,
It is the factor
that B may be presumed though it does not logically follow from A which
distinguishes permissive presumptions from inferences. The latter are
merely logical conclusions which the trier of fact is permitted to draw from
certain facts in evidence, i.e., given A the trier may assume B because the
existence of B logically follows from the existence of A. Thus if X is
proved to have been the agent of Y at a certain time, the trier may assume
that he continued to be Y's agent for a reasonable period thereafter in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
B. ProceduralEffect of Presumptions
The burden of proof is composed of two elements: (1) the burden of
producing evidence, which is the responsibility of seeing that there is
introduced at trial sufficient evidence to support a finding in favor of the
party having the burden, and (2) the burden of persuasion, which is the
responsibility of seeing that the trier of fact is actually persuaded to find
in favor of the party having the burden.' 6 It is upon the burden of proof
that presumptions have their effect, but whether that effect is only upon the
burden of producing evidence or upon both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion is a question on which the courts are
in dispute. The question is: what duty is imposed by a presumption on
the opponent of the presumed fact? May he rebut the presumption merely
by producing a required amount of evidence pointing to the non-existence
of the presumed fact or must he persuade the trier of fact that the presumed
fact does not exist?
According to the Thayer view the opponent has only the duty of producing sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably
conclude the non-existence of the presumed fact. Once he has produced
this amount of evidence (and it makes no difference whether it is believed
by the judge or the jury) 17 the presumption drops out of the case completely and has absolutely no effect on the determination of the existence
or non-existence of the presumed fact.' 8 It should be emphasized that
under the pure Thayer view all presumptions have the effect of shifting
the burden of producing evidence only; they never affect the burden of
15. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS or EVIDENcE 31-32 (3d ed. 1961). For a thorough
discussion of the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur, see Roberts, supra note 7, at 11.
16.

MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE

419-23

(4th ed. 1957). The authors suggest that the burden of producing evidence and the
burden of persuasion are more accurately called the risk of non-production and the
risk of non-persuasion respectively, since the burdens are discharged when the
required amount of evidence has been introduced irrespective of whether it has been
introduced by the party having the burden or by his opponent. Id. at 422.
17. McIver v. Schwartz, 50 R.I. 68, 145 AtI. 101 (1929).
18. See, e.g., Silva v. Traver, 63 Ariz. 364, 162 P.2d 615 (1945) ; Kirschbaum v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 N.J.L. 5, 42 A.2d 257 (1945) ; Strawhorne v. Atlantic
Coast Life Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 40, 119 S.E.2d 101 (1961) ; MODEL CODE Ov EVIDENCE
rule 704 (1942).
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persuasion. The so-called New York rule is, in effect, the Thayer rule
modified by the requirement that to rebut the presumption the opponent
must introduce "substantial" evidence. 19
Diametrically opposed to the Thayer rule is the so-called "Pennsylvania rule" 20 under which a presumption imposes upon the opponent of
the presumed fact not only the duty of producing evidence of its nonexistence but also the duty of persuading the trier of fact that it does not
21
exist. Many courts apply the "Pennsylvania rule" to some presumptions
although they apply essentially a Thayerian rule to most. In Hinds v.
John Hancock Ins. Co. 22 the Supreme Court of Maine adopted a sort of
"semi-Pennsylvania rule," holding that a presumption persists until the
trier of fact is convinced that the non-existence of the presumed fact is as
23
likely as its existence.
Unlike Model Code of Evidence Rule 704 which expresses a pure
Thayerian view of the procedural effect of presumptions, Uniform Rule of
Evidence 14 offers a dual approach. If the facts giving rise to the pre24
sumption have some probative value as evidence of the presumed fact,
the presumption is rebutted only when the trier of fact is persuaded that
the presumed fact does not exist. If the basic fact or facts have no such
19. See, e.g., Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1930).
20. Considering the confusion which exists in the Pennsylvania decisions on the
effect of presumptions it seems anomalous, if not ridiculous, to refer to a "Pennsylvania
rule" on the effect of presumptions. Until Watkins v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 315
Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934), most of the Pennsylvania decisions had held that a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Linaweaver v. Wanamaker, 299
Pa. 45, 149 Atl. 91 (1930) ; Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 112 Atl. 528 (1921) ; Vuille
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 42 Pa. Super. 567 (1910). But there were a few decisions
indicating that only the burden of producing evidence was affected. See, e.g., Neubert
v. Armstrong Water Co., 211 Pa. 582, 61 Atl. 123 (1905) ; Mansel v. Nicely, 175
Pa. 367, 34 Atl. 793 (1896). Watkins was generally considered to have abolished
in Pennsylvania the rule that presumptions shift the burden of persuasion and to
have put Pennsylvania squarely in the Thayer column. But four years after Watkins,
in In re Grenet's Estate, 332 Pa. 111, 2 A.2d 707 (1938), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the presumption of payment of a judgment note arising from lapse of
time had the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion. And later decisions have
attributed the same effect to other presumptions. See, e.g., Obici Estate, 373 Pa. 567,
977 A.2d 49 (1953) (presumption of continuing domicile) ; McNulty v. General Am.
Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa. Super. 288, 33 A.2d 796 (1943) (presumption of death after
seven years absence) ; Sefton v. Valley Dairy Co., 345 Pa. 324, 28 A.2d 313 (1942)
(presumption of agency). In addition the validity of reading Watkins as having
changed the Pennsylvania law with regard to presumptions generally has been directly
challenged. Smith v. Hennessey, 11 D.&C.2d 354 (1957); Levin, Pennsylvania and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 1, 12-15 (1954). For further discussion of the confusion existing in Pennsylvania with respect to presumptions see Cooper, The ProceduralEffect of a Rebuttable
Presumption of Law, 23 U. PiTT. L. Rev. 685, 696-703; Levin, supra 12-20; Roberts,
supra note 7, at 22-29.
21. See, e.g., Page v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 Atl. 890 (1928) (presumption of
undue influence) ; Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944)
(presumption against suicide) ; Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Manos, 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d
857 (1954) (presumption of legitimacy).
22. 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959).
23. See also Diller v. North California Power Co., 162 Cal. 531, 123 Pac. 359
(1912) ; Tresise v. Ashdown, 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928).
24. The comment to UNIFORM RULE OF EVWD9NCE 14 states, "Nearly all presumptions are of this sort."
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probative value the presumption is rebutted, as under the Thayer approach,
by the introduction of sufficient evidence to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. 25 The Supreme Court of Connecticut has
approved another hybrid view. In O'Dea v. Amodeo26 that court said, "No
general rule ... can ... be laid down as to the effect of a particular presumption in the actual trial of a case, for this depends upon the purpose
it is designed to serve. '27 Presumptions based on convenience28 or probability,28 said the court, cease to have effect when the opponent produces

substantial countervailing evidence, but those which arise against a party
because he has peculiar knowledge or ability to acquire knowledge of
facts proving or disproving the presumed fact"0 impose upon him the duty
of proving those facts peculiarly within his knowledge. 3'
C. Instructing the Jury on Presumptions
Much has been written on the subject of how the jury should be
instructed as to presumptions.3 2 The great weight of authority supports
33
the proposition that the jury should never hear the word "presumption".
Where a presumption has only the effect of shifting the burden of producing
evidence, the determination as to whether sufficient evidence has been
introduced to rebut the presumption rests entirely with the judge. If such
evidence is introduced he merely eliminates the presumption from the case
at that point. Where a presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of
persuasion the judge need only inform the jury that one party or the other
has the burden of persuasion on a certain issue without telling them why.
However, this failure to supply the jury with a reason for allocating the
25. The drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence chose to follow the Model
Code position with respect to presumptions in which the basic fact has no probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact because the Supreme Court of the United
State has held unconstitutional a statute which made the establishment of such a
basic fact fix the burden of persuasion on the party against whom the presumption
was invoked. Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929). The
Court has also held unconstitutional a statute which made the establishment of such
a basic fact shift the burden of producing evidence to the defendant in a criminal case.
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
26. 118 Conn. 58, 170 Atl. 486 (1934).
27. Id. at 60, 170 Atl. at 487.
28. E.g., the presumption that the laws of a sister state are the same as those of
the forum and the presumption of the survival after death of the others of one of
several persons killed in a common disaster.
29. E.g., the presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed was
received by the addressee and the presumption of death after seven years absence
without tidings.
30. E.g., the presumption of loss through the bailee's negligence on his failure to
return the bailed property and the presumption that plaintiff's deceased was in the
exercise of due care when killed by defendant's negligence.
31. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 61, 170 Atl. 486, 487-88 (1934).
32. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 7; McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge
Tell the Jury About Presumptions?, 13 WASH. L. Rzv. 185 (1938) ; Morgan,
instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REv.
59 (1933).
33. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer) 303 U.S. 161 (1938) ; Alpine
Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 60 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Orient Ins. Co. v.
Lox, 218 Ark. 804, 238 S.W.2d 757 (1931); Ammundson v. Tinholt, 228 Minn. 115,
36 N.W.2d 521 (1949).
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burden of persuasion in a particular manner may tend to bewilder them.
Because of this tendency, Professor McCormick has suggested that the
jury be told that there is a presumption in favor of the existence of fact B
and that they are to find fact B to be true unless they are persuaded that
it is not.3 4 But an instruction of this sort comes dangerously close to an
instruction that the presumption is evidence of the presumed fact, a proposition which has been rejected by most authorities.8 5 Presumptions are not
evidence, i.e., material to be weighed by the jury in reaching their conclusion, but rather aids to judicial reasoning by which the judge may determine
which party shall have the burden of producing evidence or the burden of
persuasion on a given issue.
III.
THE THAYER-WIGMORE

VIEW OF CONFLICTING

PRESUMPTIONS

Thayer's summary denunciation of the doctrine of conflicting presumptions is followed in his text by this line of reasoning:
At common law our principal triers of fact are that changing untrained
body of men the jury, to whom it would be idle to address such speculations on the subject as fill the books of the civilians; the considerations which are to govern and sway their thoughts must be large,
simple, untechnical. Nor are these
refinements much better adapted
8 6
to the mental habits of our judges.
Since the turn of the century, when this criticism was voiced, the questions
which juries and judges have been called upon to resolve in the determination of the outcome of cases have become increasingly complex, so complex, in fact, that the mental process of determining the weights to be
accorded two conflicting presumptions seems simple by comparison.
Thayer's argument, therefore, has little validity as a reason for summarily
deleting from the trial of a case all presumptions which are in conflict with
other presumptions.
Wigmore's attack is more direct. The problem, as he sees it, is not
one of conflicting presumptions, but one of successive presumptions. He
argues thus: A presumption either does or does not. operate against a
given party at a given point in the trial. If it does, and he rebuts it by the
introduction of sufficient evidence, then it drops out of the case. He may
then succeed in creating by his evidence a second presumption which
operates against his opponent who may in turn dispatch this second presumption by the introduction of contrary evidence. "But the same duty
34. MCCORMICK, EVID4NCE § 314 (1954).
35. U.S. ex rel. Scharlon v. Pulver, 54 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1931); Watkins v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Ati. 644 (1934) ; Van Ausdall v. Van Ausdall,
48 R.I. 106, 135 Atl. 850 (1927); THAYER 314: "Presumptions are not in themselves
either argument or evidence, although for the time being they accomplish the result
of both." Contra, In re Pitcairn's Estate, 6 Cal. 2d 730, 59 P.2d 90 (1936) ; Siler v.
Siler, 152 Tenn. 379, 277 S.W. 886 (1925).
36. THAYER 343.
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cannot at the same time exist for both parties, and thus in strictness presumptions raising the duty cannot conflict." 3 7 This argument has met with
approval in a few cases. In City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais,38 the

leading case following the Thayer-Wigmore view, the question was which
of two towns was liable for the funeral expenses of a pauper. During the
trial two presumptions arose, the presumed fact of one being that plaintiff
city's overseer of the poor had the duty to care for the pauper and the
presumed fact of the other being that he had no such duty. After quoting
extensively from an earlier Vermont case19 holding that a presumption
shifts only the duty of producing evidence the court said:
Since under the rule adopted in the latter case the sole effect of a
presumption is to fix the burden of producing evidence, it is a necessary
corollary that conflicting presumptions are legal impossibilities, because
the burden of producing evidence as40 to the same issue cannot be put
upon both parties at the same time.
The logic of the Wigmore argument seems, at first blush, to be unimpeachable. A closer examination, however, reveals that the argument
leaves several matters unexplained. In the first place, what of the situation
where the evidence introduced by one party gives rise to both of the conflicting presumptions? If that were the case the trial judge would have to
decide immediately which presumption was stronger in order to fix the
burden of producing evidence, he could not wait for the second party to
introduce evidence neutralizing the effect of one or both of the presumptions thus solving the conflicting presumptions problem before it arose as
suggested by Wigmore. In the second place, on the practical side, most
American courts follow the Thayer view with regard to the effect of presumptions generally, yet they also indulge in the practice of balancing
conflicting presumptions. 41 Apparently these courts see no inconsistency
in balancing two presumptions whose effect is to shift only the burden of
producing evidence. Alternatively, these courts may see the logical inconsistency of the practice but choose to balance the presumptions anyway
for reasons of policy. Finally, it has been seen above that the Thayer view
of the effect of presumptions is by no means the only one in use, and that
even those courts which adopt the Thayer view as a general rule may
9 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2493 (3d ed. 1940).
38. 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350 (1944).
39. Tyrell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 109 Vt. 6, 192 Atl. 184 (1937).
40. City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 109 Vt. 6, 14, 39 A.2d 350, 356 (1944).
Contra, McMahon v. Cooney, 95 Mont. 138, 25 P.2d 131 (1933); "It is sometimes
said that conflicting presumptions of law do not arise in the consideration of a cause;
that they appear successively, and exist until overcome by another. But such a statement is a mere quibbling with terms. . . . One presumption of greater dignity may
overcome another of less." Id. at 143, 25 P.2d at 133.
41. Compare Kirschbaum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 N.J.L. 5, 42 A.2d 257
(1945), declaring for the Thayer view of the procedural effect of presumptions, with
Sillart v. Standard Screen Co., 119 N.J.L. 143, 194 Atl. 787 (1937), balancing the
presumption in favor of the continuance of life against the presumption in favor of
the validity of marriage.

37.
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apply to some presumptions a different theory; to wit, one having some
effect on the burden of persuasion. Where this is done the major premise
of the Wigmore argument - presumptions have the effect of shifting only
the burden of producing evidence - is gone and the whole argument falls
to the ground.

42

IV.
THE

UNIFORM

RULE

15

APPROACH

TO

CONFLICTING

PRESUMPTIONS

A. The Scholars

The major support for the technique for dealing with conflicting presumptions suggested by Uniform Rule 15 is found in the fact that it
represents, far more than the Thayer approach, the actual practice of a
majority of American courts. However, there is also scholarly support for
the Uniform Rule 15 position, primarily in the person of Professor Edmund
M. Morgan. 43 Professor Morgan's dispute with the Thayer approach
goes to its very root, i.e., the proposition that a presumption shifts only
the burden of producing evidence. The Thayer approach, Morgan contends,
is fundamentally unsound in that it fails to take account of the reasons
behind the creation of various presumptions.
To contend that a presumption which has behind it only considerations
of convenience should have the same procedural consequences as one
in accord with the normal balance of probability or supported by
accepted ideas of desirable social policy, or both, is to argue for a
crass rule of thumb and to approve a sort of action
in this field which
44
provokes severe condemnation in most others.
Morgan urges adoption of Professor Bohlen's suggestion 45 that a presumption should affect the burden of proof or the burden of persuasion
depending upon the purpose for which the presumption was created.
Professor Morgan is also of the opinion that presumptions should be
classified according to the reasons behind their creation and that where
there is a conflict between two presumptions of different classes the one
which should prevail is that which belongs to the class supported by the
weightier reasons; if both presumptions are of the same class, then both
should be dropped from the action.. 6 The advantage of such a classification
42. It should be noted that a trial judge could, for reasons of convenience, decide
to eliminate both conflicting presumptions from the action notwithstanding that they
have the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion. Indeed, Uniform Rule 15 provides
that this should be done where neither presumption is supported by weighty considerations of policy or logic.

43. See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv.
906, 916-34 (1931).
44. Id. at 924.
45. See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden
of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. Rv. 307 (1920), reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW

ov

at 636 (1926).
46. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. Rev. 906,
931-32 (1931). See also 1 MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS Ov EVIDXNCn 32-34 (3d ed. 1961).
TORTS
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is that it provides for greater uniformity of decision than the Uniform Rule
15 proposal; the courts are provided with a workable standard to which
they can refer in resolving conflicts. The disadvantage of such a system,
however, is that if too rigidly applied it may lead to results which are both
unsound and unfair in those cases where a peculiar set of circumstances
47
calls for an alteration of the weights to be accorded the presumptions.
It will be noted that Uniform Rule 15 is stated in very general terms thus
allowing the courts a wide discretion in determining which presumption is
supported by "the weightier considerations of policy and logic" under all
the circumstances of the case.
Professor Levin 48 has praised the Uniform Rules of Evidence for
adopting the "Pennsylvania rule" on the effect of presumptions at least as
to presumptions whose basic fact has some "probative value as evidence of
the existence of the presumed fact."'49 He questions the desirability of the
conclusion reached by Thayer and Wigmore on conflicting presumptions
while characterizing the Uniform Rule 15 approach as an immediate advantage of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.50
B. The Cases
The practice of balancing conflicting presumptions according to the
reasons supporting them first appears in the case of Rex v. Twyning.5 '
In that case Mary had married Richard and had co-habited with him
for only a few months before he "enlisted for a soldier," went abroad,
and was not heard from again. A little more than a year after Richard's
departure, Mary married Francis with whom she co-habited and by whom
she had children. Six years after the second marriage took place Mary
and her children were removed by officers of the crown to the town of
Twyning which was the place of Mary's legal residence and, since she
was a pauper, the community responsible for her care. The town refused to accept responsibility for the care of the children contending
that since Mary had a husband living at the time of her marriage to
Francis, the marriage was invalid and the children were illegitimate.
They were therefore the responsibility of the town in which they were
born and not the town of their mother's legal residence. On the issue
of the validity of the second marriage two conflicting presumptions arose:
(1) since at the time of Mary's second marriage Richard had been ab47. Another possible system of classifying presumptions would be to ascribe a
specific weight or force to each individual presumption. Although open to the same
objection as the Morgan system, the more detailed system would certainly have the
advantage of greater procedural efficiency. The task of grading every presumption
in existence, however, has been appropriately characterized as an "esoteric exercise
in abstruse categorization." Roberts, An Introduction to the Study of Presumptions,
4 VILL. L. REv. 475, 482 (1959).
48. Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and
Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. Rgv. 1 (1954).
49. UNIFORM RULE op EVIDSNC 14(a).
50. Levin, supra note 42, at 21-22.
51. 2 B. & Ald. 386 (1819)
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sent for only one year, it was presumed that he was still alive and thus
it was impossible for Mary to contract a valid marriage. (2) the second
marriage was presumed to be valid or, in other words, Mary was presumed to be innocent of crime. The Court treated the case as if it were
a criminal prosecution for bigamy and held that in order to establish
the invalidity of the second marriage, it was necessary to prove that
Richard was alive at the time of the second marriage and that a mere
presumption that he was still alive would not suffice. The presumption
of validity of marriage, said the court, overcame the presumption of life
52
and the party attacking the marriage had the burden of proof.
Under the Thayer view, the approach taken by the court was clearly
wrong. Both presumptions should have been eliminated from the case
regardless of the strong social policy behind the presumption of the
validity of marriage, and regardless of the fact that due to the hazardousness of the first husband's occupation it was as likely, if not more likely,
that he was dead at the time of the second marriage than that he was alive.
Under the view espoused by Uniform Rule 15, however, the court's resolution of the problem was correct. The social policy behind the presumption of the validity of the second marriage was properly considered
and that presumption accorded greater weight than the opposing one
which had no support in social policy and under the circumstances only
questionable support in logic.
If the Court had followed the Thayer approach, the situation would
have been this: The plaintiff town would have begun the action with the
burden of proving that Mary's children were illegitimate. In order to
meet this burden, plaintiff would have introduced evidence of Mary's
marriage to Richard only one year before her marriage to Francis. Since
a person is presumed to remain alive for seven years after departure, this
evidence would have created a presumption that Richard was alive at
the time of the second marriage. Defendant, the Crown, in support of
the legitimacy of the children would have introduced evidence that the
husband was engaged in a dangerous occupation (soldier) and that there
had been no word of him for one year. This would have been sufficient
evidence, under the Thayer rule, to rebut the presumption of continued
life since a reasonable jury could find on defendant's evidence that Richard
was dead at the time of the second marriage. The evidence of Mary's
marriage t(, Francis would ordinarily have created a presumption that
the marriage was legitimate but that presumption would already have
been rebutted by plaintiff's evidence of the prior marriage since that
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Richard was alive at
the time of the second marriage. The court would have sent the case
to the jury on the evidence telling them nothing of the presumptions
which had arisen and been destroyed by the production of evidence. In
favor of the invalidity of the marriage there was the evidence that Mary's
52. Id. at 389.
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first husband was seen alive and in good health just one year before
her second marriage. In favor of the validity of the marriage was the
fact that he was engaged in a dangerous occupation and, at the time of
the trial, had not been heard of for seven years. On these facts the jury
could have resolved the question in favor of the validity of the marriage
even without the presumption, but they could also have resolved the issue
in favor of the invalidity of the marriage. By balancing the conflicting
presumptions and retaining in the action the one in favor of the validity
of the second marriage the court made it more likely that the jury would
find affirmatively on that issue. It thereby protected a strong interest
in favor of the legitimacy of children while it depressed the hardly comparable interest of the town in not having to support persons it is not
legally obligated to support.
Where, as in the Twyning case, the presumption of the continuance
of life conflicts with the presumption of the validity of marriage, and
therefore the presumptions of innocence of crime and legitimacy of children
born in wedlock, the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the
latter presumption prevails over the former.5 3 For example, in Sillart
v. Standard Screen Co. 54 plaintiff sued for workmen's compensation benefits as the wife of the deceased employee. The defense was that plaintiff
was not the wife of the decedent because at the time of her purported
marriage to him her first husband, from whom she was not divorced,
had been missing for only five years. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
pointed out that the presumption of the validity of marriage was one
founded on public policy and innocence of crime ".

.

. and it is well

settled that such presumptions overcome the presumption of the con' 55
tinuance of the life of a person even three or four years absent.
The prevalence of the presumption of innocence of crime over lesser
presumptions has also been declared in circumstances other than the
marriage cases. McMahon v. Cooney,56 for instance, saw a conflict between
the presumption that the laws of a sister state are the same as the laws of
the forum and the presumption that the law has been obeyed. The court
held that the former presumption, based largely on convenience, is inferior
to the presumption of innocence and must give way to it. In Excelsior
53. See, e.g., Murchison v. Green, 128 Ga. 339, 57 S.E. 709 (1907); Smith v.
Fuller, 138 Iowa 91, 115 N.W. 912 (1908) ; Keller v. Linsenmyer, 101 N.J. Eq. 664,
139 Ati. 33 (1927) ; Palmer v. Palmer, 162 N.Y. 130, 56 N.E. 501 (1900); In re
Thewlis' Estate, 217 Pa. 307, 66 AtI. 519 (1907) ; Town of Greensborough v. Town of
Underhill, 12 Vt. 604 (1839). Contra, Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N.E.
110 (1909).
Note that there may be circumstances under which the presumption of the continuance of life is supported by such overwhelming probability that even the presumption of innocence of crime and legitimacy of children must fall before it, as, for
example, where the previous spouse was seen alive a few days before the second
marriage. See State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385, 45 N.W. 848 (1890); Boudinier v.
Boudinier, 203 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1947).
54. 119 N.J.L. 143, 194 Atl. 787 (1937).
55. Id. at 146, 194 Atd. at 788.
56. 95 Mont. 138, 25 P.2d 131 (1933).
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Mfg. Co. v. Owens, 57 X had possession of a promissory note on which he
was maker thus creating a presumption that the note had been paid. X had
also made an assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors.
The status of his assets was such that if he had in fact paid the note he
had nothing left to assign to his creditors and the assignment was fraudulent. The court held that the presumption that the note had been paid was
overcome by the presumption that the assignment to the creditors was not
fraudulent. Moreover, it has been asserted that ".

.

. no legal presumption

is so highly favored as that of innocence; ordinarily most other presumptions yield to it in case of conflict." 58
The presumption of innocence is not the only one supported by strong
social policy which has been held to prevail over other' presumptions not
so supported. In Turro v. Turro59 the infant plaintiff, who was the posthumous child and sole heir of his intestate father based his claim to certain
land on a deed made to his father as grantee. Defendant, plaintiff's paternal
grandfather, had paid the purchase price to the grantor named in the deed.
Two presumptions arose: (1) the fact that defendant paid the purchase
price created a presumption that he intended the grantee to take title in
trust for him, i.e., there was a presumption against a gift (2) since, however, the grantee was the defendant's son a presumption arose that in
paying the purchase price defendant intended a gift. In holding that the
second presumption took precedence the court stated first that presumptions not heavily fortified by policy or probability disappear from a case
when sufficient evidence is adduced which would support a finding of the
non-existence of the presumed fact, in other words, such presumptions are
governed by the Thayer rule and when two such presumptions conflict both
may properly be dropped from the case. "But . . . where one of two con-

flicting presumptions rests on substantially stronger considerations of
policy or probability, it displaces the weaker one and stands alone in the
action." 60 The presumption in favor of the integrity of judicial decisions
has been vigorously protected when threatened by a contradictory presumption. Thus, where on rehearing of a foreclosure action in which the
plaintiff had had judgment, defendant contended that the record with the
original order of foreclosure did not show compliance with the statutory
requirements of notice and that there was a presumption that the clerk had
entered all papers filed in connection with the action, the court held that
this presumption was overcome by the stronger presumption that the
court in awarding foreclosure had acted within its jurisdiction, i.e., only
after all statutory requirements had been fulfilled. Pointing out that a
judgment or order of a court should be set aside only upon clear, satis57. 58 Ark. 556, 25 S.W. 868 (1894).
58. 1 JoNEs, EVIDENCE § 113, p. 196 (5th ed. 1958). See also McArthur v. State,
59 Ark. 431, 27 S.W. 628 (1894) ; Holtan v. Beck, 20 N.D. 5, 125 N.W. 1048 (1910).
But see, note 47, supra.

59. 38 N.J. Super. 535, 120 A.2d 52 (1956).
60. Id. at 540, 120 A.2d at 55.
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factory, and convincing evidence, the court said that to hold otherwise
".. . would subject every order and judgment to uncertainty and make
their integrity depend upon the question of whether or not a ministerial
61
official had fully performed his statutory duty".
C. The Analysis
Thayer and Wigmore, probably the most respected authorities in the
field of evidence, laid down a simple rule for courts to follow when confronted with conflicting presumptions: drop both from the action and send
the case to the jury on the evidence. Most American courts, however, have
ignored the proposed simple rule and have chosen to apply the somewhat
complex one that conflicting presumptions should be weighed according to
'the reasons supporting them and effect given to that one supported by the
worthier reasons. The question arises, why has the Thayer-Wigmore
approach been rejected in favor of the one embodied in Uniform Rule 15.
It is submitted that the answer lies in the use of presumptions by the
common law judges as a device "to control the jury in its function of fact
finding.16 2 It is common knowledge that the courts, learned in the law and
possessed of a healthy fund of experience in the trial of cases, have developed certain ideas as to what is a fair and reasonable resolution of certain
types of cases. Moreover, there are certain interests which the courts
deem worthy of protection and which interests they have moved to protect
by wrapping them in presumptions of greater force than the ordinary presumption. For example, one who attempts to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy may find that he can do so only by proof that is "not only clear,
63
direct and satisfactory, but irrefragable as well."1
As dealers in theories Thayer and Wigmore may lay down a rule to
be universally applied to all presumptions under all circumstances, and
certainly such a rule has the advantages of simplicity and theoretical purity.
But the courts, as dealers in practical trial situations, may find presumptions a useful device with which to bring about, or attempt to bring about
results which are deemed to be fair and reasonable under all the circumstances. So, where a court is presented with conflicting presumptions
rather than drop both from the action and thus lose a.powerful instrument
of control over the outcome of the case, it will balance the interests pro-

tected by each presumption, choose the one most worthy of protection and
retain the presumption which protects it. Evidence that this is the practice
of some courts is not wanting. Said one court, "Rather than rip up such
a judgment and a sale under it, both of them so old, any presumption
61. Burgess v. Lasby, 91 Mont. 482, 488, 9 P.2d 164, 168 (1932).
62. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. Rev. 906,
909 (1931). See also Lishon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553 (1870): "In each instance a
critical examination is to be made to ascertain whether that which is asserted as a
legal presumption is anything more than a conclusion of fact at which the court may
think the jury ought to arrive." Id. at 564.
63. Levin, supra note 48, at 20. Accord, In re Kerwin's Estate, 371 Pa. 147, 89
A.2d 332 (1952) ; In re Mays' Estate, 141 Pa. Super. 479, 15 A.2d 569 (1940).
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